MyCIMA

Islamic finance and alternative economic scenarios

Replies : 4
John Willsdon's picture

We are at present in the grip an economic slowdown following the credit crisis caused by the collapse of the American sub-prime market.

A question asked by many interested in Islamic finance is whether a western finance industry based on Islamic finance principles would have ended up in the same mess.

Some basic facts relating to the collapsed sub-prime market

• Developed countries relaxed mortgage credit criteria on the back of the view that property prices would continue to rise allowing adequate security against the risk of lending to individuals with little or no credit standing.

• The financial markets then packaged these mortgage obligations into a variety of securities with a variety of tranches and seniority status which had a very tenuous link to the underlying assets.

• The fall in the value of housing stock led to a panic in the finance market that the securities, which were in some cases, a substantial part of the investment stock were not underpinned by real assets. 

Would this situation have arisen in a Shari’ah compliant financial system?

Under Islamic finance the trading in debt is disallowed. Hence mortgage based securities are classed as usurious, especially where the link to actual assets is tenuous. This link to assets is key to the acceptability of Islamic securities. A direct link to such assets should be the way income is earned. Goods that a seller does not own or cannot deliver cannot form part of an Islamic contract.

It would appear that the collapse of the sub-prime market would not have happened under an Islamic financial system as the structures which were created to facilitate this market would be unacceptable.

Culture

Even if the trading of debt and other financial activities were not prohibited in the Qu'uran and Islam, I get the impression that if the 'Western' world had the values associated Islamic culture, the constant desire to "spend, spend, spend" would not be present. Thus, the bubble would not have been there to be burst.

 

Christopher Hutchison

Questions to ask

There are two fundamental principals that govern enterprises: more (profits) is better, and risk is to be avoided or mitigated.

Risk avoidance has its cost. Derivatives markets served both the risk takers and the risk averse.

While corporate failures are acceptable, failure of the economy is not.

The problem was with the size and complexity of relationships the risk takers had to the economy at large. The question to ask then is: who can be risk takers and what should their relationships be to other enterprises?

Some thoughts on your comments

Many thanks Christopher and Yaso for your responses to my original blog.

Christopher raises an important issue with regard to the spend culture we hear about. Under Islam, an important consideration when trading with someone is to consider their ability to take part in the transaction i.e. not to entice someone into trade who really can’t afford it. This seems to put the responsibility on the seller not to let the consumer spend beyond their means. Perhaps, if we looked back to western values in the earlier part of the twentieth century, we would see the same principles applied.
 
The collapse of the sub-prime market was in part due to the markets desire to sell to anyone, irrespective of their ability to repay, based on the unfounded belief that house property values would continue to rise and repossession, if necessary, would recoup any outstanding amounts. What really goes against Islamic principles in this case is the separation of the debt holders from the properties secured under the debt.

Under Islamic finance the debt owing in the sub-prime market was “owned” by third parties with no direct ties to the actual properties which had been sold. If they had been part to the original property sale they might have questioned the ability of the buyer to repay and at least taken that on board as a risk. Instead the owners of the debt bought it blind, simply as an investment with no understanding of what it really comprised. As home owners defaulted it became apparent that the debt holders had no actual recourse to the properties in question. The debt in effect became toxic or irrecoverable.

This brings us back to another consideration under Islamic finance i.e. that of uncertainty. In any Islamic finance transaction risk is acceptable, but not uncertainty. Uncertainty cannot exist in relation to the constituent parts to the transaction i.e. the parties to the transaction, the nature of the goods/services, the time of delivery, the price to be paid etc. Due to the fact that the holders of the sub-prime debt were many transactions away from the original properties and parties to which the debt related, uncertainty existed in most parts of the later transactions.

To a certain extent Yaso hits the nail on the head when he talks about the complexity of relationships which exist in the twenty first century. Following Islamic finance to the letter would result in trading only taking place between first parties to any transaction i.e. those who have a direct relationship with the actual transaction. Any debt would simply be held by the seller.

Under Islamic finance, debt should not be traded so the original debt holder would only see the debt extinguished when the customer paid. Such a simple position would result in trade in general slowing down. Under conventional finance many businesses sell their debt to free-up cash in order to buy new goods to sell. This may prove to be part of the circle which will be difficult to square in relation to the growth of Islamic finance as an alternative to conventional finance.

Another take on this

John,

I agree with what you say except the point on risk and uncertainty.  Risk results from uncertainty.  If the banks had held on to their loans they would have essentially carried the risk of default from uncertainty in the housing market.  By selling the loans or securetizing the banks eliminated their exposure to loan default risks.  One might then argue that the banks in fact followed the Islamic law by selling their debt and eliminating the uncertainty (of loan default). 

As the Islamic law would have it the original risk taker would BOTH reap the rewards AND suffer the loss consequences.  As you say, if the originator does not hold the risk they have no obligation to ensure that the borrower is trustworthy.  Islamic law or not, this makes business sense.